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SACRIFICIAL RIGHTS: THE CONFLICT
BETWEEN FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION
AND ANIMAL RIGHTS
Significant legal issues arise at the point where competing and
equally important rights conflict.' Problems involving the consti-
tutional guarantee of the free exercise of religion 2 have given rise
to some of the most troubling, yet compelling examples of this phe-
nomenon.3 The premise that the government shall not interfere
with the religious beliefs of its citizens is one that most Americans
hold sacred.4 However, there have been many instances where the
religiously inspired actions of certain groups or individuals have
been at odds with both the law' and the tolerance of the majority.6
In some instances, the majority has a valid interest in preventing
certain behavior, such as ritual murder.7
1 See Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Natl Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 181-82
n.12 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that "individual must exercise his own rights
with due regard for the first amendment rights of others"); Mississippi Women's Medical
Clinic v. McMillan, 866 F.2d 788, 790 (5th Cir. 1989) (discussing conflict between freedom
of expression and reproductive freedom); Stewart v. Corbin, 850 F.2d 492, 497 (9th Cir.
1987) (discussing conflict between right to speedy trial and public's right to be protected
from crime), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1016 (1989). See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERI-
CAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 576-985 (1978) (discussing freedom of expression, religion, and
privacy).
2 See Arnold v. Board of Educ., 880 F.2d 305, 314 (11th Cir. 1989). "Problems can arise
when government regulation compels conduct which is forbidden by one's religion." Id.;
United States v. Means, 627 F. Supp. 247, 257 (W.D.S.D. 1985) (discussing problem of gov-
ernment regulation which prohibits behavior mandated by religion); see also ROBERT T.
MILLER & RONALD B. FLOwERS, TowARD BENEvoLENT NEUTRALITY: CHURCH, STATE, AND
THE SUPREME COURT 4 (4th ed. 1992) (discussing cases spanning many decades in which
Supreme Court has attempted to solve problems resulting from free exercise clause).
3 See infra notes 18-29 and accompanying text (discussing evolution of free exercise ju-
risprudence through leading Supreme Court cases).
4 See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah, 124 L. Ed. 2d 472, 484 (1993). This
concept "is so well understood that there are few violations recorded in [Supreme Court]
opinions." Id.; see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972). "The values underlying
[the free exercise and establishment clauses] have been zealously protected." Id.
5 See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990) (discussing use of illegal con-
trolled substances); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 254-55 (1982) (reviewing refusal to
pay Social Security tax); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 161-62 (1878) (concerning
illegal practice of bigamy among Mormons), overruled by Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana,
450 U.S. 707 (1981).
6 See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164. "At common law,.., polygamy has been treated as an
offence against society." Id.
7 See Wolman v. Essex, 342 F. Supp. 399, 406 (S.D. Ohio 1972), affd, 413 U.S. 923
(1973); see also Hollon v. Pierce, 64 Cal. Rptr. 808, 814 (Cal. 1968) (upholding dismissal of
school bus driver whose religion advocated kidnapping and ritual sacrifice of children).
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Sometimes, however, it is apparent that the majority is simply
trying to suppress those with minority beliefs, in which case the
free exercise clause is rightly invoked for protection." The most
challenging category involves situations which fall between these
extremes. For example, it is difficult to reconcile society's commit-
ment to religious freedom with its purported "war on drugs," when
certain religions require the use of illegal drugs.9 The same prob-
lem seems to arise when dealing with emerging questions such as
the scope of animal rights.
This Note will explore one such conflict, which arises when the
right to free exercise is extended to the point of sacrificing living
creatures. Part One discusses the scope and overall history of reli-
gious freedom in the United States, with particular emphasis on
the goal of protecting minority beliefs from the will of the major-
ity. Part Two provides an in-depth analysis of the recent Supreme
Court decision, Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah,10 which
held that religious freedom prevails over concern for animals.1 1
Part Three explores the concept of animal rights, including its his-
torical, moral and theoretical bases, and various criticisms. Part
Four reviews the history of religious animal sacrifice, and sug-
gests that religious freedom and animal rights are not
irreconcilable.
I. THE TREATMENT OF FREE EXERCISE
A. Historical Development
The freedom of religion concept has been an important aspect of
this nation's history, 12 well before its incorporation into the Bill of
8 See Church of Lukumi, 124 L. Ed. 2d at 495 (city enacted ordinances with clear intent
of interfering with ritual sacrifices practiced by petitioners).
9 See, e.g., Smith, 494 U.S. at 874 (ruling state could fire peyote users from jobs); Peyote
Way Church of God v. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210, 1212-13 (5th Cir. 1991) (upholding ban
on peyote possession); Native American Church of New York v. United States, 468 F. Supp.
1247, 1248 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (granting limited exemption for religious peyote use).
10 124 L. Ed. 2d 472 (1993).
11 See id. at 495-500 (stating that interests of community were outweighed by peti-
tioner's free exercise rights).
12 See TRIBE, supra note 1, § 14-3, at 816-18 (1978) (discussing competing political and
religious views espoused by Roger Williams, James Madison, and Thomas Jefferson as to
whether it was "church" or "state" which needed protection in order to prosper); see also
Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Reli-
gion, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1409, 1421 (1990). "Although the free exercise and establishment
clauses were proposed in 1789 and ratified in 1791, the American states had already exper-
ienced 150 years of a higher degree of religious diversity than had existed anywhere else in
the world." Id. at 1421.
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Rights. 13 Despite, or perhaps because of this history, there has
been widespread disagreement as to the scope and purpose of this
right.14 Even though the free exercise and establishment clauses
appear side by side in the Constitution,' 5 it is hard to deny the
seemingly inherent tension between these provisions. 16 Neverthe-
less, early courts had relatively few problems in interpreting these
clauses. 17
It was not until Reynolds v. United States,'" in 1878, that the
judiciary became involved in free exercise cases, holding that a
dichotomy existed between religiously motivated "belief' and "be-
havior."19 Although not without some criticism,20 this distinction
13 U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or preventing the free exercise thereof." Id.; cf.
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-07 (1940) (extending these restrictions to state
governments).
14 See TRIBE, supra note 1, § 14-4, at 819-23 (discussing various theories advanced as to
extent of free exercise clause). Some commentators are willing to go so far as to recommend
the abandonment of any religious exemption whatsoever. See William P. Marshall, The
Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free Exercise Exemption, 40 CASE W. REs. L.
Rav. 357, 388-94 (1989-90). The author argues that religiously motivated speech and be-
havior should be awarded no greater protection than constitutionally protected secular
speech. Id.
15 See supra note 13 (quoting constitutional text).
16 See Zobrest v. Catalina Hills School Dist., 125 L. Ed. 2d 1, 1 (1993) (concerning right
of deaf student in parochial school to have publicly funded interpreter present in class);
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312-13 (1952) (concerning dismissal of New York City
public school students from class so they could attend religious instruction); see also Jesse
H. Choper, The Free Exercise Clause: A Structural Overview and an Appraisal of Recent
Developments, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 943, 947-48 (1986). "On the one hand, the Court has
read the establishment clause as saying that if a law's purpose is to aid religion, it is uncon-
stitutional. On the other hand, the Court has read the free exercise clause as saying that,
under certain circumstances, the state must aid religion." Id.; cf TRIBE, supra note 1, § 14-
2, at 813-15. "To the framers, the religion clauses were at least mutually compatible and at
best mutually supportive." Id. at 814. But see David L. Gregory & Charles J. Russo, Let Us
Pray (But Not "Them".!): The Troubled Jurisprudence of Religious Liberty, 65 ST. JOHN'S L.
Rav. 273, 288-89 (1991) (suggesting that in wake of several recent Supreme Court deci-
sions, gap between two clauses is narrowing as "mainstream" religion is accommodated).
17 See Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 250 (1833). Some of the most notable
early cases involved efforts to apply the Bill of Rights to the states. Id.
18 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
19 Id. at 166. Among other things, the Court expressed fear that a religious exception
would set up a dual standard for religious and non-religious behavior. Id. Furthermore, the
Court asked:
Can a man excuse his practices to the contrary [of established law] because of his reli-
gious belief? To permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief
superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law
unto himself. Government could exist only in name under such circumstances.
Id. at 166-67.
20 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 219-20 (1972). The case involved rural Amish
who wanted to keep their children out of public school after eighth grade in order to avoid
its corrupting influence on their simple way of life. Id. The Court cast doubt on the theory
that belief and action were easily separable. Id.; see also Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin:
The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion, 102 HARv. L. Rzv. 933, 938 (1989)
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has remained a key part of religious jurisprudence to the present
day.2 Beginning with the landmark 1963 case of Sherbert v. Ver-
ner,2 2 however, the Supreme Court began to exhibit greater defer-
ence to free exercise claims through the adoption of the "compel-
ling interest" test.23 This test required that an infringement of
free exercise 24 be justified by a strong and legitimate state inter-
est.25 In 1972, the Court further broadened this rule in Wisconsin
v. Yoder,26 which held that even if a compelling state interest ex-
isted,27 it would have to be weighed 28 against other basic constitu-
tional rights.29
(claiming that Reynolds decision drained free exercise clause of its essential function of
protecting minority beliefs).
21 See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (stating that if law does not
explicitly target religion, Reynolds principle still applies); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S.
599, 603 (1961) (pointing out that while freedom of belief is absolute, government may still
enforce social duties); see also Roberto A. Torricella, Jr., Comment, Babalu Aye Is Not
Pleased: Majoritarianism and the Erosion of Free Exercise, 45 U. MIAMI L. Rv. 1061, 1070
(1991) (noting that Reynolds was controlling case for nearly a century).
22 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (concerning rights of Seventh Day Adventists to collect unemploy-
ment benefits after having been fired for refusing to work on Saturdays). The Court held
that "[g]overnment imposition of such a choice puts the same kind of burden upon the free
exercise of religion as would a fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday worship."
Id. at 404.
23 Id. at 403 (discussing operation of compelling interest test); see also TRIBE, supra note
1, § 14-10, at 852 (discussing Sherbert case).
24 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403-06. The Court denied the argument that an infringement
only occurs with the restriction of a legal "right" as opposed to a legal "privilege." Id. at 404;
see also TRIBE, supra note 1, § 14-10, at 851 (pointing out that Sherbert Court extended
previous free exercise holdings by dealing with economic benefit rather than direct restric-
tion on religious freedom). But cf Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605-06 (1961) (uphold-
ing Pennsylvania's mandatory Sunday closing laws despite fact that it constituted eco-
nomic burden to Orthodox Jews who closed their stores on Saturdays).
25 See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406-09 (making it explicit that serious abuse, rather than
minor inconvenience is required). The Court distinguished this case from Braunfeld on dif-
fering secular motives. Id. at 408. But cf Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism
and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 1109, 1127-28 (1990) (submitting that Supreme
Court never actually used "compelling interest" test in years following Sherbert decision).
26 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
27 See id. at 221 (discussing state's interest in educating its citizens in order to ensure
effective civic participation in addition to self-reliance); see also Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925). "No question is raised concerning the power of the State reason-
ably to regulate all schools ... to require that all children of proper age attend some school
.. " Id.
28 See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 205 (discussing conflict of rights and need to balance); LEo
PFEFFER, RELiGION, STATE AND THE BURGER COURT 60 (1984). The state's interest in univer-
sal education must be balanced against the parents' interest in religious upbringing of
their children. Id.
29 See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215-19. "The values and programs of the modern secondary
school are in sharp conflict with the fundamental mode of life mandated by the Amish
religion." Id. at 217. The Court thus concluded that "[t]he impact of the compulsory attend-
ance law on respondents' practice of the Amish religion is not only severe, but inescapable,
for the Wisconsin law affirmatively compels them, under the threat of criminal sanction, to
perform acts undeniably at odds with the fundamental tenets of their religious beliefs." Id.
at 218.
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B. The Effect of Employment Division v. Smith
Yoder was, in many respects, the broadest interpretation of the
free exercise clause through subsequent years.3 0 The Court gradu-
ally moved away from the absolutist position,3 1 represented by
Sherbert and Yoder, while declining to specifically overrule these
earlier decisions. 32 A major turning point occurred with the deci-
sion in Employment Division v. Smith 3 a 1990 case which, simi-
lar to Sherbert, dealt with the availability of unemployment bene-
fits to workers who had lost their jobs in Oregon, due to their
religious beliefs.34 In Smith, the respondents,35 members of the
Native American Church,3 6 were fired for the use of peyote, an
illegal controlled substance.3 " For the Court,39 the fact that drug
use is illegal was enough to permit a holding radically different
30 See infra notes 31-32 and accompanying text (discussing later Supreme Court
decisions).
31 See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 259 (1972) (granting wider berth to govern-
ment interests by introducing "undue interference" test). At the same time, the Court
seemed increasingly willing to make concessions to "mainstream" religious belief and activ-
ity. See PFEFFER, supra note 28, at xxi-xxiii (discussing Court's shift during 1980s to more
"accomodationist" stance concerning religion); Torricella, supra note 21, at 1077-83 (dis-
cussing chain of cases after Yoder).
32 See PFEFFER, supra note 28, at xiii (demonstrating that for numerous political rea-
sons, Court compromised).
33 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
34 Id. at 919 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). "Respondents believe, and their sincerity has
never been at issue, that the peyote plant embodies their deity, and eating it is an act of
worship and communion. Without it, they could not enact the essential ritual of their reli-
gion." Id.
35 Id. at 876. The Oregon Supreme Court had ruled that the statute outlawing peyote
use violated free exercise by failing to provide for a religious exemption. Id. This led to the
appeal by the state. Id.
36 Id. at 874; see also Gregory & Russo, supra note 16, at 286-87 (discussing briefly his-
tory of judicial treatment of American Indians).
37 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 916 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (discussing very limited extent
of illegal peyote traffic). The fight for religious exemptions for the use of peyote has been
litigated often and with varying results. See Peyote Way Church of God v. Thornburgh, 922
F.2d 1210, 1213-14 (5th Cir. 1991) (upholding federal and Texas statutes prohibiting pos-
session); Native American Church of New York v. United States, 468 F. Supp. 1247, 1249
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (holding that Congress has power to control drug use regardless of reli-
gious purpose); State v. Whittingham, 504 P.2d 950, 952-54 (Ariz. 1973) (holding bona fide
religious use protected by free exercise clause), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 946 (1974); People v.
Woody, 394 P.2d 813, 816-21 (Cal. 1964) (applying Sherbert test and finding insufficient
state interest).
38 See OR. REv. STAT. § 475.992(4X1) (1993); see also 21 U.S.C. § 812(c) sched. I(c)(12)
(1988) (proscribing peyote use).
39 See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 907 (1990). This was a 6-3 decision,
with Justices Brennan and Marshall joining Justice Blackmun's dissent. Id. Furthermore,
Justice O'Connor, while concurring in the judgement, found fault with the reasoning be-
hind the decision. Id. at 891.
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from those of Sherbert and Yoder. 40 The essence of the holding was
that as long as a law is "neutral" and "generally applicable,"4 it
will not be struck down on free exercise grounds.42 Additionally,
the Court neglected to mandate an exemption from the Oregon
statute under the Sherbert "compelling interest" test,43 holding
that while such an exemption could certainly be permissible, it
was not constitutionally required."
The Smith holding was subjected to a great deal of criticism, not
the least of which came from the concurring and dissenting opin-
ions.4 5 Justice Sandra Day O'Connor while concurring in the
judgement, pointed out that the majority not only overlooked
precedents, but completely ignored them.'6 She further argued
that the "compelling interest" test should have properly been ap-
plied.47 However, she reached the conclusion that the State
demonstrated exactly such a compelling interest, by declaring a
"war on drugs. " 48 Justice Harry Blackmun dissented and agreed
with much of Justice O'Connor's analysis,49 but differed with her
on this point,50 noting the exemptions granted by other states.5 '
40 See supra notes 21-29 and accompanying text (discussing facts and holdings of Sher-
bert and Yoder).
41 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 879-80 (following rule established in Reynolds).
42 Id. at 881. The Court acknowledges, however, that a statute may be ruled unconstitu-
tional if the burden on free exercise also burdens other guaranteed constitutional rights.
Id.
43 Id. at 882-86 (pointing out test had been rejected in numerous previous cases, and also
limiting it to employment compensation situations).
44 Id. at 890.
45 See infra notes 46-52 (discussing bases of concurring and dissenting opinions).
46 See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 895-96 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
"In Yoder we expressly rejected the interpretation the Court now adopts." Id. at 895.
47 Id. at 897-903 (pointing out Sherbert balancing test properly applied to cases involv-
ing both affirmative prohibition and denial of benefits based on conduct). Justice O'Connor
added that the Court "[has] not 'rejected' or 'declined to apply' the compelling interest test
in [its] recent cases." Id. at 900 (citing Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 699
(1989) and Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm., 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987)). Further-
more, Justice O'Connor distinguished the cases in which the Court declined to follow the
Sherbert rule due to their "narrow, specialized contexts.' Id.
48 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 903-07 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that drug use is
harmful no matter how small group of users or by what motivation it is used); see also
Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 674 (1989) (proclaiming drug abuse to be
one of greatest dangers faced by American society).
49 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 908 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (agreeing with Justice
O'Connor's opinion with regard to use of Sherbert test).
50 Id. at 910-919. Justice Blackmun noted:
Oregon has never sought to prosecute defendants, and does not claim that it has made
significant enforcement attempts against other religious users of peyote. The State's
asserted interest thus amounts only to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced
prohibition.
Id. at 911.
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Interestingly, the majority was also accused of extending its reach
beyond the proper scope of its appellate review.
52
Legal scholars and commentators have been even more vigilant
in their attacks on Smith, finding fault with the decision for its
misuse of precedent, 53 its theoretical basis,54 and its interpreta-
tion of the Constitution.55 Furthermore, numerous critics have
pointed to Smith as additional evidence of the increasingly "ac-
comodationist"56 or "majoritarian"5 7 attitude of the Court, with
some even accusing the Court of "cultural imperialism."58 These
views find support in statements of the Court, which clearly con-
sider government administration to be more important than the
religious rights of a small minority.59
51 See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 911-12 (1990); see also State v. Whit-
tingham, 504 P.2d 950, 954 (Ariz. 1973) (holding bona fide religious use protected by free
exercise clause), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 946 (1974); People v. Woody, 394 P.2d 813, 821 (Cal.
1964) (applying Sherbert test and finding insufficient state interest).
52 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 909 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting that State had
neither sought to enforce law in question, nor relied on its constitutional validity).
53 See McConnell, supra note 25, at 1120-27. The author calls the use of precedent
"troubling, bordering on shocking." Id. at 1120. McConnell discusses the convenient over-
sight of decisions such as Yoder, noting that while "some Justices disagreed with the prece-
dents .... none denied the existence of these precedents." Id.; see also Kenneth Marin, Note,
Employment Division v. Smith. The Supreme Court Alters the State of Free Exercise Doc-
trine, 40 AM. U. L. Rxv. 1431, 1471 (1991). "The Court did not apply or interpret precedent
to reach its decision in Smith; rather it dissected each prior free exercise case to make it
appear as if those cases mandated the Smith ruling." Id.
54 See McConnell, supra note 25, at 1129-52 (commenting on Court's reliance on "neu-
trality" in face of varied minority beliefs, and its implicit fear of anarchy in wake of conflict
between free exercise and rule of law).
55 Id. at 1114-16. "The Court does not deny that the broader reading [of the free exercise
clause], which would require exemptions, is a 'permissible' reading. Indeed, the Court does
not even deny that it is the more obvious and literal meaning." Id. at 1115.
56 See Gregory & Russo, supra note 16, at 288. The authors discuss the Smith decision in
conjunction with the Court's ruling in Westside Community Schools v. Mergens, 496 U.S.
226 (1990) and conclude that there is a wide separation between rights the Court is willing
to grant to those in mainstream and restrictions placed on those in minority groups. See
generally PFEFFER, supra note 28, at 201-34 (discussing treatment of assorted "fringe" reli-
gious groups).
57 See Torricella, supra note 21, at 1106-07. The author commented:
[Tlhe first amendment stands as a barrier, protecting the firm ground of individual
freedom in matters of conscience from the rising sea of majoritarian insensitivity.
Courts must proceed cautiously in any endeavor which may reshape or erode this pro-
tective wall lest we all be engulfed by the wave of intolerance to follow.
Id.
58 Gregory & Russo, supra note 16, at 286 (claiming that Smith Court displayed tremen-
dous insensitivity towards Native Americans).
69 See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990) (noting necessity of smooth
government operation); see also Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protection Ass'n, 485
U.S. 439, 451 (1987). "However much we might wish it were otherwise, government simply
could not operate if it were required to satisfy every citizen's religious needs and desires.'
Id.
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Smith, however, has not been without its defenders.6 0 Propo-
nents argue that a truly egalitarian society would treat religious
and non-religious behavior in the same way.61 Nevertheless, it is
apparent that Smith has met with general disapproval, especially
considering that some federal courts have distinguished the hold-
ing by interpreting it strictly.62 Perhaps the best indication of pop-
ular sentiment towards the Smith decision is the fact that federal
legislation, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (the
"Act"),63 was introduced to reverse the thrust of the decision.6 4
Congress overwhelmingly approved the Act 65 and it was subse-
quently signed into law by President Bill Clinton in November of
1993.66 Therefore, despite the trend within the judiciary to deny
free exercise claims of individuals practicing minority religions,67
it is apparent that religious beliefs still hold a favored position in
American society.
60 See infra note 61 (discussing arguments in favor of Smith decision).
61 See William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U.
Cm. L. REv. 308, 312-13 (1991). The author argues that there are two major problems with
the concept of religious exemptions. Id. The first problem is determining the validity of the
belief, which could easily lead to free exercise conflicts. Id. at 310-11. Second, the very
concept of granting exemptions based on a specific kind of belief tends to contradict the
very basis of the First Amendment. Id. at 319-20; cf Choper, supra note 16, at 957-61
(discussing how free exercise clause can lead to preference of some religions over others).
62 See United States v. Boyll, 774 F. Supp. 1333, 1341 (D.N.M. 1991) (holding that stat-
ute restricting religious freedom does not fall within ambit of Smith).
63 Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993). The Religious Freedom Restoration Act
provides:
(a) In General-Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of reli-
gion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as provided
in subsection (b).
(b) Exception-Government may substantially burden a person's exercise of religion
only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person--(1) is in further-
ance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of
furthering that compelling governmental interest.
Id. § 2.
64 See id. § 2(b). The express purpose of the Act is to restore the Sherbert and Yoder tests
and thus relieve the "undue burden" placed on free exercise. Id.
65 See Senate Overwhelmingly Passes Religious Freedom Reformation Act, 31 Gov't
Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 1538, at 1440 (Nov. 1, 1993). The bill, co-sponsored by 54 sena-
tors, passed by a margin of 97-3. Id.
66 See Peter Steinfels, Clinton Signs New Law Protecting Religious Practices, N.Y.
TnvEs, Nov. 16, 1993, at A18. The Act was hailed as a major victory for minority religions.
Id.
67 See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (holding that free exercise
clause did not prohibit application of Oregon drug law to ceremonial ingestion of peyote);
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Prot. Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 441-42 (1988) (free exercise
clause did not prevent building of road on land traditionally used for religious ceremony).
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II. FREE EXERCISE MEETS ANIMAL RIGHTS: THE LUXCMI CASE
Within the context of this religious and political environment,
the issue of animal sacrifice and its relationship with "enlight-
ened" modem attitudes is reached. 68 Although animal sacrifice
has been a traditional part of religious behavior for millennia, the
modem concern for animal welfare has brought about an interest-
ing quandary in which these competing interests must be weighed
against one another.6 9
The 1993 case of Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah70 is
particularly interesting because of the form of religious exercise in
question and the nature of the rights in conflict. The case involved
proponents of the Santeria faith,7 ' which has been practiced in
various forms for centuries.72 Essentially, it combines traditional
African religion with Catholic imagery and symbolism. 73 The cen-
tral rites of Santeria require the sacrifice of animals by cutting
their throats.74 Historically, its practitioners have been compelled
68 See discussion infra parts III & IV.
69 See infra notes 78-90 and accompanying text (discussing background and holding of
Church of Lukumi case).
70 124 L. Ed. 2d 472 (1993).
71 Id. at 484. While this was the first free exercise case involving Santeria, the religion is
no stranger to the courtroom, having been involved in several suits regarding characteriza-
tions of the Church as a "cult." See Hochberg v. Howlett, 92 Civ. 1822, 1992 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 18255, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 1992). Plaintiffs sought class certification and al-
leged a conspiracy depriving them of their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to prac-
tice the Santeria religion. Id. In addition, several cases have arisen dealing with the in-
volvement of some practitioners in the drug trade. See United States v. Freyre-Lazaro, 3
F.3d 1496, 1499 (11th Cir. 1993). The defendants were convicted of conspiracy to purify
contaminated cocaine. Id. Although the charges were not related to the practice of the faith
itself, the conspiracy took place in a shop selling artifacts related to Santeria. Id.
72 Church of Lukumi, 124 L. Ed. 2d at 485; see also Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v.
Hialeah, 723 F. Supp. 1467, 1469-71 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (describing in detail the history and
development of Santeria), affd, 936 F.2d 586 (11th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 124 L. Ed. 2d 472
(1993).
73 Church of Lukumi, 124 L. Ed. 2d at 485; see also 13 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION 66 (M.
Eliade ed., 1987) (concerning use of Catholic saints as medium for worshipping spirits).
74 Church of Lukumi, 124 L. Ed. 2d at 485; cf Jones v. Butz, 374 F. Supp. 1284, 1290-91
(S.D.N.Y.) (describing similar methods used in Jewish ritual slaughter), affd, 419 U.S. 806
(1974); see also Humane Slaughter Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1902(b) (1988). The Act provides that
slaughter shall be permitted if done:
by slaughtering in accordance with the ritual requirements of the Jewish faith or any
other religious faith that prescribes a method of slaughter whereby the animal suffers
loss of consciousness by anemia of the brain caused by simultaneous and instantane-
ous severance of the carotid arteries with a sharp instrument and handling in connec-
tion with such slaughtering.
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to maintain a low profile. 75 However, the appellants attempted to
establish a formal house of worship in the respondent community
of Hialeah, Florida. 76 This met with considerable resistance. 77 Us-
ing Florida's animal cruelty statute 7 8 as a foundation, the city en-
acted three ordinances79 which prohibited "ritual animal sacrifice"
and the unnecessary killing of animals.8 0
The Supreme Court determined that the Smith test"' was not
applicable since the stated purpose of the ordinances8 2 was not
facially neutral, but expressly targeted religious beliefs and prac-
tices.8 3 To determine whether this restriction was justified, the
Court applied the "compelling interest" test established in Sher-
bert.84 While it is arguable that the ordinances represented valid
state interests in preventing animal cruelty,"5 protecting public
75 See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah, 124 L. Ed. 2d 472, 485. "[Tlhe religion
and its rituals were practiced in secret. The open practice of Santeria remains infrequent."
Id.
76 Id. at 485-86.
77 See id. (noting widespread dismay among residents of community and quick organiza-
tion of emergency town meeting).
78 See FLA. STAT. ch. 828.12 (1987) (imposing penalty of imprisonment or fine for bring-
ing about "unnecessary" death of an animal).
79 See Hialeah, Fla., Res. 87-66 (1987) (prohibiting religious groups from engaging in
behavior contrary to public health and morals); Hialeah, Fla., Res. 87-40 (1987) (adopting
language of Florida Animal Cruelty Statute); Hialeah, Fla., Res. 87-90 (1987) (outlawing
"ritual sacrifice" for purposes other than food).
so See supra note 79 (discussing nature of statutes).
81 See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah, 124 L. Ed. 2d 472, 489-91 (1993) (dis-
cussing reason facts did not fall within scope of Smith); see also supra notes 33-44 and
accompanying text (explaining application of test).
82 See Hialeah, Fla., Res. 87-66 (1987) (resolution directed at "any and all religious
groups.... .); see also Church of Lukumi, 124 L. Ed. 2d at 491. The Court reviewed several
other factors in deciding whether religion is the motivation behind the legislation, includ-
ing the use of language such as "ritual" and "sacrifice,' although this alone is not sufficient
to be determinative. Id. Most powerful is the evidence as to the actual application of the
statute, particularly when all three statutes are considered together. Id. at 491-92.
83 See Church of Lukumi at 491-92. The Court noted that, although the ordinances by
themselves may prohibit -secular activity, due to careful drafting their combined effect is a
"religious gerrymander.' Id. "A pattern of exemptions parallels the pattern of narrow
prohibitions.' Id. at 493.
84 See id. at 498 (employing narrower Smith interpretation of compelling interest); see
also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972) (applying slightly expanded compelling
interest test).
85 See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah, 723 F. Supp. 1467, 1486 (S.D. Fla.
1989) (recognizing animals experience pain and fear during captivity and sacrifice), affd,
936 F.2d 586 (11th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 124 L. Ed. 2d 472 (1993); see also Brief Amicus Curiae
of International Society for Animal Rights, Citizens for Animals, Farm Animal Reform
Movement, In Defense of Animals, Performing Animal Welfare Society, and Student Action
Corps for Animals, in Support of Respondent at 23-24, Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v.
Hialeah, 124 L. Ed. 2d 472 (1993) (No. 91-948) [hereinafter Brief of Amici Curiae in Sup-
port of Respondent].
1994] SACRIFICIAL RIGHTS
health 6 and the welfare of children, 7 the Court concluded that
the ordinances were not "narrowly tailored to advance [those] in-
terest[s]." s For this reason, the ordinances were unanimously de-
clared to be in violation of the free exercise clause.8 9 Although
there is little question that the city of Hialeah specifically targeted
the appellants,90 the case raises interesting questions about how
competing rights should be reconciled.
A question arises as to whether Hialeah could have written a
statute which sufficiently protected animals while remaining
facially neutral. This would conceivably require making all
animal slaughter illegal, a prospect that even most animal rights
activists would presently consider extreme.9 ' There are some who
argue that the ordinances are, in fact, facially neutral, providing
examples of non-religious behavior to which they could be ap-
plied.92 Ironically, with the passage of the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act,93 it is quite conceivable that an exemption would
still be required for religious groups who sought to perform sacri-
fices, unless a sufficient compelling state interest could be
demonstrated.
86 Church of Lukumi, 723 F. Supp. at 1485 (discussing risk of disease, particularly sal-
monella). It is clear that governments may act to prevent the spread of disease. See Prince
v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944). "The right to practice religion does not in-
clude liberty to expose the community... to communicable diseases." Id.; cf State ex rel
Swam v. Pack, 527 S.W.2d 99, 109 (Tenn. 1975) (upholding Tennessee Snake Handlers Act
in name of public safety).
87 Church of Lukumi, 723 F. Supp. at 1485-86; cf Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondent, supra note 85, at 24 (discussing public morals aspects of preventing animal
cruelty); see also Peck v. Dunn, 574 P.2d 367, 369 (Utah 1978) (discussing relation between
prevention of animal cruelty and upholding public morals), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 927
(1978).
8 See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah, 124 L. Ed. 2d 472, 493 (1993). The
Court notes that "gratuitous restrictions" were placed on religious behavior, and that, fur-
thermore, by pursuing the harm collaterally rather than directly, the city was actually
following the least narrow path. Id.; see also TRmae, supra note 1, § 14-10, at 846-59 (discus-
sion of "least restrictive means" test).
89 See Church of Lukumi, 124 L. Ed. 2d at 499-500. The Court emphasized that the goals
must be secular in nature. Id.
90 See Church of Lukumi, 124 L. Ed. 2d at 495-96 (describing proceedings of city council
hearings prior to enactment of ordinances). Members of the council intended to distinguish
Santeria from Jewish slaughter rituals. Id. at 496.
91 See Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, supra note 85, at 28. "[W]hile the
enlightened sensibilities of our society unanimously and rightly condemn the unnecessary
killing of animals, amici recognize that, regrettably, in this culture it is generally accepted
that the primary purpose for [animals] is to provide food for the sustenance of humankind."
Id.
92 See id. at 21 n.18 (describing assorted secular rituals such as college fraternities and
fox hunts).
93 See supra notes 63-66 (discussing purpose and substance of Religious Freedom Resto-
ration Act).
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III. ANIMAL RIGHTS
A. Legal Rights
Interestingly, these cases involved "rights" which have achieved
something less than full recognition in the eyes of mainstream so-
ciety.9 4 Freedom of religion is, of course, widely recognized, but
not without its limits.9 5 As far as "animal rights"96 are concerned,
there are many who deny that animals have rights at all.97 In fact,
this has been the prevalent view throughout history.98 However,
there has been considerable change today with the advent of legis-
lation designed to protect the welfare of animals.99 This change
seems to suggest that governments have a demonstrable interest
in preventing cruelty to animals. Those who argue that animals
enjoy actual legal rights'0 0 face a difficult task, since there seems
94 See infra notes 97-98 (discussing present and historical opposition to concept of
animal rights).
95 See United States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 439, 443-46 (D.D.C. 1968) (determining "va-
lidity" of religion, courts should look at substance over form to determine sincerity). The
Kuch court declared the Neo-American Church, which was heavily involved in the use and
sale of drugs, to be a calculated mockery of more established and accepted religions. Id. at
444-45. Of course, such a decision necessarily involves a value judgement and opens the
door for further problems. See Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025, 1030-36 (3d Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 908 (1982). While asserting that "it is inappropriate for a re-
viewing court to attempt to assess the truth or falsity of an announced article of faith," the
court held that the petitioner's organization, MOVE, did not constitute a religion, and the
plaintiff's requests for special diets in prison did not have to be granted. Id.; see also TRIBE,
supra note 1, § 14-11, at 861. "The perception of the claimant's sincerity inevitably reflects
the factfinder's view of the reasonableness of the claimant's beliefs." Id.; Torricella, supra
note 21, at 1063-64 (discussing how minority religions face particular restrictions).
96 See Neil D. Hamilton, Feeding Our Future: Six Philosophical Issues Shaping Agricul-
tural Law, 72 NEB. L. REV. 210, 245 (1993) (defining animal rights as concept where ani-
mals are recognized to be free not to be eaten or exploited by humans); see also, HOLMES
ROLSTON, III, ENVIRONMENTAL ETHics 47-51 (1988) (distinguishing between "natural" and
"unnatural" rights).
97 See R. G. FREY, INTERESTS AND RIGHTS 16-17 (1980) (arguing that morality is useless
in gauging rights); James L. Huffman, Do Nature and Species Have Rights?, 13 PuB. LAND
L. REV. 51, 75 (1992) (arguing that since interests of animals must be protected by humans,
they are not "rights" as humans know them).
98 See Emily S. Leavitt, Introduction to the Original Edition in ANIMAL WELFARE INSTI-
TuTE, ANIMALS AND THEIR LEGAL RIGHTS xi (4th ed. 1990) (explaining that tradition viewed
animals as "things" at ready disposal of humans); cf ROLSTON, supra note 96, at 65 (dis-
cussing numerous arguments for human superiority).
99 See infra note 114 (listing assorted statutes banning cruelty to animals).
100 See generally Leavitt, supra note 98, at xi passim. Animals benefit from a great deal
of protective legislation. Id. Nevertheless, these laws generally appoint governmental agen-
cies as not only the guardians of these "rights," but also as their beneficiaries. See Christo-
pher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?-Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects, 45
S. CAL. L. REV. 450, 461-62 (1972). Frequently, in fact, these agencies have strong ties to
the very industries engaged in the type of behavior the agency is meant to regulate. See
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 745-48 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (questioning
whether United States Forest Service could properly represent interests of nature).
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to be little explicit constitutional support for this argument. 10 '
However, it is undeniable that animals have been subjected to
human laws and punishment. 10 2 Furthermore, on occasion ani-
mals have appeared as defendants in actual trials, complete with
attorneys representing them.' The fact that society deems ani-
mals worthy of a degree of Due Process, 0 4 as well as what
amounts to a specific constitutional right,10 5 in this capacity pro-
vides at least an argument that they are entitled to some rights in
other respects as well.
In the wake of a general increase in environmental conscious-
ness,10 6 there has been a tremendous increase in sensitivity to-
wards the treatment of animals.10 7 Some of the areas affected by
this increased awareness include laboratory experimentation, 08
hunting,10 9 endangered species," 0 the agriculture and food indus-
101 See U.S. CoNsr. amends. I-XXVI. These amendments discuss rights in relation to
"people" or "persons." Id. But see Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 742 (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(noting that legal standing has been granted to nonhuman entities such as ships and corpo-
rations); Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligences, 70 N.C. L. REv.
1231, 1238-39 (1992) (briefly discussing history of non human entities possessing legal
rights); Stone, supra note 100, at 452-53 (noting that courts once considered it unthinkable
that corporations could possess legal rights).
102 See Jeff Stryker, The Dog Walks, N.Y. TimEs, Feb. 3, 1994, at A21 (detailing ordeal of
Taro, an Akita dog banished from New Jersey after biting child).
103 See id. In the case of Taro, the legal fees spent in trying him exceeded $100,000. Id.
The author points to numerous other cases, many occurring in medieval times, where a
variety of species were tried for charges ranging from murder to "'feloniously eating and
wantonly destroying' barley crops." Id.
104 Cf. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1. The amendment provides: "[n]o State shall deprive
.. any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law. . . ." Id.
105 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial... and to have the Assistance
of Counsel for his defence.' Id.
106 See Dena Kleiman, How Do You Fix a Broken Planet?, N.Y. TuMEs, Apr. 25, 1990, at
C1 (discussing changes in way typical Americans view environment as result of Earth
Day); cf Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 741-42 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(claiming that this interest necessitates granting legal standing to natural objects).
107 See ROLSTON, supra note 96, at 45 (discussing various factors responsible for in-
creased sensitivity to animals); cf Humane Soc'y v. Lyng, 633 F. Supp. 480, 486 (W.D.N.Y.
1986). The court asserted: "[it has long been the public policy of this country to avoid un-
necessary cruelty to animals." Id.
108 See Rebecca Dresser, Research on Animals: Values Politics and Regulatory Reform,
58 S. CAL. L. REv. 1147, 1147-52 (1985) (discussing moral concerns that have centered
around animal testing for centuries); see also Karen L. McDonald, Comment, Creating a
Private Cause of Action Against Abusive Animal Research, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 399, 399
(1986) (criticizing federal regulations such as Animal Welfare Act of 1970, 7 U.S.C.
§§ 2131-2156 (1988), as inadequate in truly protecting animals involved in research from
unnecessary experimentation).
109 See Aileen M. Ugalde, Comment, The Right to Arm Bears: Activists' Protests Against
Hunting, 45 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1109, 1113-16 (1991) (discussing efforts of activists to protect
targeted animals through such tactics as hunter harassment); cf. Dorman v. Satti, 862 F.2d
432, 437 (2d Cir. 1988) (declaring Connecticut Hunter Harassment Act to be in violation of
First Amendment), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1099 (1989).
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try,"' 1 and religion." 2 In addition to these relatively narrow areas
of concern, increased awareness of cruelty to animals has mani-
fested itself both judiciallyi1 3 and legislatively in virtually every
state, 1 4 as well as under federal jurisdiction. 1 5
B. Moral Rights
There has been a great deal of literature devoted to the moral
and philosophical aspects of animal suffering.1 16 Proponents of
animal rights base their arguments on a number of general philo-
sophical constructs, some morally grounded, while others have a
110 See Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1985) (establishing guidelines
for protection of certain species from commercial and other activities).
111 See Hamilton, supra note 96, at 245-48. The author discusses increased regulation of
the livestock industry and growth of the vegetarian movement, both of which can be at
least partially linked with animal rights interests. Id.
112 See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text (discussing Hialeah's legislative at-
tempt to halt ritual animal sacrifice).
113 See, e.g., People v. Reed, 176 Cal. Rptr. 98, 103 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1981)
(animals must be given proper care and attention); Hargrove v. State, 321 S.E.2d 104, 108
(Ga. 1984) (dogfighting); State v. Abellano, 441 P.2d 333, 340 (Haw. 1968) (cockfighting);
Anderson v. George, 233 S.E.2d 407, 410 (W. Va. 1977) (owners liable for abandonment or
neglect); cf Emily S. Leavitt, The Evolution of Anti-Cruelty Laws in the United States, in
ANnMAL WELFARE INsTrrTTE, ANPMALS AND THEIR LEGAL RxGHTs 13 (4th ed. 1990). The first
animal cruelty statute was established in the Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1641. Id.
"America has the distinction of being the first country to acknowledge the rights of animals
by enacting statutory legislation to protect them from cruel treatment." Id.
114 See ALA. CODE § 13A-11-14 (1993); ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.140 (1993); ARiz. Rsv. STAT.
ANN. § 13-2910 (1993); AR. CODE ANN. § 5-62-101 (Michie 1993); CAL. PENAL CODE § 597
(West 1994); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18-9-202 (West 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-
247 (West 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1325 (1993); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-801 & 802
(1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 828.12 (West 1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-4 (1993); HAw. REv.
STAT. § 711-1109.3 (1993); IDAHO CODE § 18-2102 (1993); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 8, para 703.01
(Smith-Hurd 1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-46-3-12 (West 1994); IOWA CODE ANN. § 717.2
(West 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4310 (1992); Ky. Rev. STAT. ANN. § 525.130 (Michie/
Bobbs-Merrill 1993); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:102.1 (West 1993); MASs. GEN. L. ANN. ch.
272, § 77 (West 1993); MD. CODE ANN. § 27:59 (1992); ME. Rev. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 4011
(West 1993); MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 752.21 (West 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 343.21
(West 1994); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-41-1 (1991); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 578.012 (Vernon 1993);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-211 (1993); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 574.100 (Michie 1993); N.H.
Rev. STAT. ANN. § 644:8 (1992); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 4:22-26 (West 1994); N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTs.
LAw § 353 (1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-360 (1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 36-21.1-02 (1993);
Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 959.13 (Anderson 1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1685 (West
1994); OR. REV. STAT. § 167.315 to .330 (1992); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5511 (1994); R.I.
GEN. LAws § 4-1-2 to 3 (1993); S.C. CODE ANN. § 47-1-40 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-14-202 (1993); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.11 (West 1994); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-9-301 (1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 3.1-796.122 (Michie 1993); VT. ST. ANN. tit. 13,
§ 352 (1992); WASH. REv. CODE. ANN. § 16.52.070 (West 1993); W. VA. CODE § 61-8-19
(1993); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 951.02 (West 1993); Wyo. STAT. § 6-3-203 (1993).
115 See Federal Humane Slaughter Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1902(b) (1988); Animal Welfare Act, 7
U.S.C. §§ 2131-2157 (West 1993).
116 See BERNARD E. ROLLIN, ANIMAL RimHTs & HUMAN MORALTrY 19 passim (1992) (dis-
cussing evolution and theoretical background of animal rights concept); ROLSTON, supra
note 96, at 45-91 (discussing philosophical arguments relating to pain and suffering).
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stronger practical basis." 7 The traditional view that animals are
inferior, and thus available for use as humans see fit,"" has come
under attack in the wake of new-found scientific discoveries con-
cerning animal intelligence." 9 Even assuming that animals lack
the rational abilities of humans, it is widely argued that this is
immaterial, since animals suffer fear and pain in the same way as
humans. 2 ° The fact that these creatures feel the same sensations
as humans serves as a strong deterrent to "unnecessary
killing."' 21
A similar school of thought maintains that animals have a
"moral right" 22 to survival, equivalent to a "right to life."' 23 This
argument has come under strong attack, 124 however, and even its
sympathizers acknowledge its inherent practical difficulties. 25
Other theorists have shifted from these "biocentric"126 concepts in
favor of those which reflect the rights of humans. 127 The theories
are based on the idea that people have a right to enjoy the Earth
117 See infra notes 118-23 and accompanying text (discussing various theories regarding
human relations with animals).
118 See supra note 98 (discussing history and various arguments in support of human
superiority to animals); see also RoLm, supra note 116, at 30-31 (discussing and criticizing
traditional view as case of "might makes right"). The author analogizes to such indefensible
acts as criminals preying on elderly or Nazis' attempted extermination of European Jews.
Id. at 31.
119 See ROLLIN, supra note 116, at 43-53 (focusing on animals' ability to recognize human
language and to appreciate certain abstract concepts); see also Eugene Linden, Can Ani-
mals Think?, TIME, Mar. 22, 1993, at 54 (discussing wave of new discoveries which demon-
strate animals can communicate, plan, and experience emotions).
120 See ROLLIN, supra note 116, at 64-69; see also ROLSTON, supra note 96, at 45 (concern-
ing capacity of animals to suffer and duty of humans to prevent this).
121 See RoLUN, supra note 116, at 80-81 (observing that hunters who see animals suffer-
ing first-hand often lose interest in "sport").
122 See id. at 82-83 (acknowledging that this "right" can only be considered in context of
human behavior).
123 Id. at 84-86. The author submits that unless a clear distinction between human and
animal life can be demonstrated, those who espouse an absolute right to human life must
also recognize a similar right for animals. Id.
124 See Huffman, supra note 97, at 58. The author clearly states the chief weakness of
the moral rights claim. Id. "Only those humans prepared to starve to death can assert that
every organism has a right to exist." Id. The author is willing to acknowledge the distinc-
tion made by vegetarians between animal and plant life. Id. Another criticism of such be-
liefs is that rights do not exist in a vacuum, but must be enforced and communicated within
human society. Id. But see Stone, supra note 100, at 464-73 (proposing procedure by which
nonhuman entities may achieve legal standing in their own right).
125 See ROLLIN, supra note 116, at 95-96 (proposing whether true right to life concept
would place restrictions on killing germs or pests). The author also addresses the argument
that since animals kill one another, there is no reason that humans should kill other ani-
mals. Id. at 100-01.
126 See Huffman, supra note 97, at 58-66 (discussing various theories of nature-based
rights).
127 See id. at 66-68 (distinguishing these as "anthropocentric" or human-based rights).
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as it is and to allow all of its creatures to exist in their "natural"
state.'2 8 Still others shift the emphasis from animal "rights"129 to
a "duty" 30 on the part of humanity to preserve all life, and partic-
ularly to avoid the infliction of needless pain and suffering. 13 1
Perhaps the most intriguing legal argument for animal rights
involves the idea of "natural law," 3 2 which maintains that there
are absolute concepts of right and wrong.133 Under this theory,
man-made rules are subjugated to moral principles13 4 to the point
where, if the law does not conform with a certain "moral truth,"
one has a duty to actually disobey such a law. 135 The logical exten-
sion of this rationale is the concept of "natural rights," which
maintains that there are certain inalienable rights which no gov-
ernment may take away.'3 6 This philosophy frequently has reli-
gious overtones, 3 7 although it has had seemingly the opposite im-
128 See id. at 66 (distinguishing between individual and societal claims to nature); see
also Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Prot. Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 459-61 (1988) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting) (discussing essential bond with land central to American Indian reli-
gion and culture).
129 See Kent Greenawalt, The Limits of Rationality and the Place of Religious Convic-
tions: Protecting Animals and the Environment, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1011, 1025 (1986).
"[T]he use of the term 'rights' in this context is disputable, no matter how stringent the
duties of human beings." Id.; see also ROLSTON, supra note 96, at 47-51 (discussing range
and evolution of concept of "rights" in general).
130 See Huffman, supra note 97, at 68-73 (discussing the obligation to protect animals in
a moral and practical context); see also Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing
Revisited: How Far Will Law and Morals Reach? A Pluralist Perspective, 59 S. CAL. L. REv.
1, 129-30 (arguing animals are on different moral plane from humans).
131 See Stone, supra note 130, at 129-30 (claiming obligation to avoid inflicting pain can
only be dealt with on specific instances).
132 See ROLLIN, supra note 116, at 110. The author discusses the notion, dating back to
ancient Greece, that law and morality are "logically inseparable." Id.; cf Oliver W. Holmes,
The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 459 (1897). 'The law is the witness and external
deposit of our moral life." Id.
133 See ROLLIN, supra note 116, at 110 (explaining and providing examples of natural law
theory).
134 See id.; see also RONALD DwORmN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 22-24 (1977) The au-
thor describes rules as arbitrary standards which must be followed or discarded, and prin-
ciples as standards which represent broader societal interests in justice. Id. The author
gives several illustrations of cases where a strict adherence to the rules would violate
broader moral principles. Id.; cf Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 509, 22 N.E. 188, 189
(1889) (holding that grandson could not inherit under legally valid will after murdering
grandfather since this would violate moral principles at expense of rules).
135 See ROLLIN, supra note 116, at 110. This theory relies, of course, on the assumption
that such truths actually exist. Id. at 111-12.
136 See id. at 110-11 (arguing government would lose expectation of obedience); see also
DwomaN, supra note 134, at 147 (stating that citizens possess "moral rights" against gov-
ernment); cf THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776) (providing an exam-
ple of how these rights are perceived in political context).
137 See ROLLIN, supra note 116, at 110-11 (noting especially strong connection with Cath-
olic Church); see also Greenawalt, supra note 129, at 1040-43 (discussing connection be-
tween religious belief and ethics).
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pact in the realm of constitutional law,'13 where it is closely tied to
the concept of "unenumerated rights.
" 13 9
The acknowledgement of these rights lends strong support to
the premise that established man-made law is meant to be altered
through the "moral progress" of society. 140 Just as the drafters of
the Constitution did not consider slaves to be constitutional "per-
sons,"14 ' it is clear that they did not believe that animals had
rights either.142  However, as the moral standards of society
evolved with regard to slavery, the law adapted to stay in con-
formity with them, culminating with the enactment of the Thir-
teenth Amendment. 14  It is entirely conceivable that society will
eventually realize that animals are entitled to the same basic
rights as humans. There have been efforts to apply such rights to
the non-human world.14 4 It seems undeniable, however, that full
recognition of this concept is a long way off. At least for the time
being, animals generally remain property only, and not legal
entities. 145
138 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (recognizing right to terminate pregnancy);
see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965). The Court, in overruling a state
ban on the sale of contraceptives, noted that "[wle deal with a right of privacy older than
the Bill of Rights. .. ." Id.
139 See U.S. CONST. amend I The amendment provides: "The enumeration in the Con-
stitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by
the people." Id.; see also William 0. Bertelsman, The Ninth Amendment and Due Process of
Law-Toward a Viable Theory of Unenumerated Rights, 37 U. CiN. L. REv. 777,793 (1968).
The author also discusses certain well-established unenumerated rights, such as family,
privacy, personal fulfillment and economic rights. Id. at 790-92.
140 See DWORKwN, supra note 134, at 147 (arguing this mandates an activist court to
interpret "legal" rights in context of"political morality"); see also ROLLIN, supra note 116, at
117-18 (claiming it is necessary to make moral arguments in order to achieve legal change).
141 See THE FEDERALIST No. 54, at 370 (James Madison) (Benjamin F. Wright ed., 1961)
(proposing that for purposes of representation, slaves should not be considered part of
population).
142 Id. "[TIhe slave may appear to be degraded from the human rank, and classed with
those irrational animals which fall under the legal dominion of property.'" Id. (noting pre-
dominant view of framers).
143 U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIII, § 1. This section of the amendment provides: "Neither slav-
ery nor involuntary servitude ... shall exist in the United States, or in any place subject to
their jurisdiction." Id.
144 See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 749-52 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (dis-
cussing attempt to give legal standing to forest); Stone, supra note 100, at 456 (arguing for
legal rights in natural objects).
145 See, e.g., Gluckman v. American Airlines, Inc., No. 92 Civ. 3740, 1994 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 1351, at *17 to *20 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 1994) (ruling there can be no recovery for loss
of companionship or pain and suffering following death of pet dog); Snyder v. Bio-Lab, Inc.,
94 Misc. 2d 816, 818, 405 N.Y.S.2d 596, 597 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1979) (holding damage
to dairy cows limited to market value). But see Corso v. Crawford Dog & Cat Hosp., 97
Misc. 2d 530, 531, 415 N.Y.S.2d 182, 183 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. Nassau County 1979). "[A] pet is not
just a thing but occupies a special place somewhere in between a person and a piece of
personal property." Id.
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IV. THE CONNECTION BETWEEN ANIMALS ANDm RELIGION
A. Historical Background
Since animals arguably enjoy a somewhat higher legal and
moral status in today's society, their use in religious rituals is
troubling. The relationship between religion, particularly Judeo-
Christian belief, and animals is a complex one. 146 Animals have
traditionally been tied to religion through mythology, 147 symbol-
ism,14 s and ritual,14 9 representing both good and evil.' 5 ° Sacrifice
is included in this tradition.'"' Much of the history of animal sac-
rifice has its basis in hunting.152 This tradition was perpetuated
by numerous animal cults, 5 3 which followed practices reflecting
"animist naturalism." 5 4 This philosophy is primarily concerned
with the existence of "spirits" in nature, whether in trees or in
animals.' 5 5 While such belief is nearly universal,156 western theol-
ogy 157 has characterized it solely as a "cult" religion. 158
Notwithstanding that Santeria is strongly linked to Catholi-
cism,'5 9 there is a strong tendency among the Judeo-Christian
majority in this country to distance themselves from such prac-
tices. ' Ironically, reviewing the history of these western reli-
gions reveals that they are no strangers to animal sacrifice them-
146 See infra notes 159-67.
147 See 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION 291 (M. Eliade ed., 1987).
148 See id. (noting animals often represent core values of human existence).
149 See id. at 293 (noting many rituals involve killing prey).
150 See id. at 291-92. The author described images of animals as "sacred" or "divine" on
one hand, and as unnatural monsters on the other. Id.
151 See 12 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION, supra note 147, at 554. The role of blood in tradi-
tional sacrifices is a crucial one, often relating to fertility. Id. at 546. Various theories have
been advanced for the origin of sacrificial rituals: as a gift, or alternatively, as a bribe; as an
homage; or as a link between the sacred and the profane. Id. at 550-52.
152 See id. at 546 (noting that although shedding of blood is essential to sacrificial action,
slaying is not); see also 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION, supra note 147, at 293-94 (pointing
out that sacrificial tradition emphasized cooperation between hunter and prey as an essen-
tial element of moral order).
153 See 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION, supra note 147, at 294. The members of these cults
did not worship the animals themselves, but rather the abstract principle of man and
animal as one. Id. at 295.
154 Id. at 296-302.
155 Id. at 298.
156 Id. at 291. "Even in societies with strong traditions of anthropomorphic deities, ani-
mals are an essential element of religious and social thought," Id.
157 See id. at 294 (discussing vast differences from modern Christianity).
155 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION, supra note 147, at 294.
159 See supra note 72 (describing history and development of Santeria).
160 See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah, 124 L. Ed. 2d 472, 495-96 (1993) (dis-
cussing outraged opinions of local citizens with regard to practice of Santeria in their
community).
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selves. 16 1 The ancient Greeks, for example, practiced frequent
blood sacrifice of animals and humans.'6 2 The Hebrew tradition is
full of sacrificial imagery. 163 Among the most notable examples of
this are the story of Cain and Abel,164 which can be read as en-
couraging animal sacrifice at the expense of other forms of wor-
ship, and even more significantly, the story of Abraham and Isaac,
in which God commanded Abraham to kill his only son as a sign of
his faith. 65 The history-of sacrifice in Christianity is also intrigu-
ing. The crucifixion of Jesus16 6 in conjunction with the sacrifice of
the mass and the sacrament of the Eucharist 167 are examples of
this history, tending to show that sacrifice is not exclusive to mi-
nority religions.
B. St. Francis of Assisi: "The First Environmentalist"
The Judeo-Christian tradition has historically denied the spiri-
tual nature of animals,6 8 maintaining that only humans possess
"souls."1 6 9 It is this, the tradition holds, that places humans on a
higher moral plane than other creatures.' 70 In this context, it is
fascinating to consider the life of Francis of Assisi, the medieval
Roman Catholic saint whose moral and religious influence re-
mains strong today. 17 1 Though born into wealth, St. Francis
161 See infra notes 162-67 and accompanying text (discussing history of sacrifice in west-
ern religions).
162 See 12 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION, supra note 147, at 555. The Greeks would sacri-
fice pigs, cattle, horses, asses, dogs, and even humans to various gods. Id.; see also HOMER,
THE ILIAD 560 (Robert Fagles trans., Penguin 1990) (describing litany of animals and pris-
oners of war slaughtered in tribute to fallen warrior).
163 See infra notes 164-65 and accompanying text (discussing prominent Biblical stories
involving sacrifice).
164 See Genesis 4:1 to :9. The two sons of Adam and Eve, a shepherd and a farmer, offered
sacrifices from their respective labors, the animal sacrifice being clearly preferred over the
fruits of the earth. Id.
165 See Genesis 22. Although this sacrifice was halted at the last minute, Abraham nev-
ertheless slaughtered a ram in place of Isaac. Id. at 22:13.
166 See 12 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION, supra note 147, at 555 (describing crucifixion of
Jesus Christ, according to New Testament, as perfect sacrifice, negating need for any
others).
167 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION, supra note 147, at 185-86. This central rite of Christi-
anity consists of the consumption of bread and wine, representing, through the process of
"transubstantiation," the body and blood of Christ himself. Id.; see also Matthew 26:26 to
:28 (describing Christ's words at last supper).
168 See ROLLIN, supra note 116, at 28-29.
169 Id.
170 See Greenawalt, supra note 129, at 1033-34 (discussing situations where choice must
be made to kill animal so that human life will be saved).
171 See 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION, supra note 147, at 408 (noting that he was founder
of Franciscan order of Catholic Church). Furthermore, he has long served as an inspiration
for pacifist groups and minorities. Id. at 409.
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sought spiritual enlightenment through the rejection of the mate-
rial world.' 72 He travelled to the countryside "to preach salvation
to rocks, wild flowers, and mountain thyme. " 173 In a sense, he can
be described as the first "environmentalist," devoting much of his
attention to the beauty of nature, and its connection to the divine
world. 174
Animals, in particular, played a major role in his preaching, and
he acknowledged the kinship that existed between living things as
divine creations. 175 Clearly a forebear to modern animal rights ac-
tivists, he went so far as to imply that animals do, in fact, possess
immortal Souls. 17 6 Since the concept of respect for all life is impor-
tant to Franciscan belief, it is fascinating to note that St. Francis
is a central figure in the Santeria faith.1 7 7 Apparently, while his
beliefs have become an important basis for many adherents of en-
vironmental activism,17 it is clear that society as a whole could
still learn something from St. Francis regarding the rights of
animals.
CONCLUSION
Even the most vehement defender of animal rights must ac-
knowledge that there are limits to the amount of recognition
which can be achieved. Ultimately, political factors must be in-
cluded into this question. While there is an apparent conflict be-
tween the lofty standards of religious belief and morality on one
side, and the practical reality of political society on the other, the
two may be more closely connected than one might realize. The
Constitution, while attempting to avoid the establishment of an
official state religion, necessarily made religion part of political
172 Id. at 408-09.
173 NIKos KAZANzAius, SAINT FRANcis 199 (1962).
174 See 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION, supra note 147, at 409.
175 Id.
176 See KAzANTzAias, supra note 173, at 271. "The Day of Judgement is coming near, my
brothers, so let us hurry. When it arrives it must find all men, animals, birds, plants, and
stones prepared." Id.
177 See 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION, supra note 147, at 92 (pointing out association
between St. Francis and Santeria's god of divination, Orunmila).
178 See 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION, supra note 147, at 409. Interestingly, while this is
frequently applied to animals (fellow sentient beings), few seem willing to go to the extent
to which Francis of Assisi preached in relation to other natural objects. See Greenawalt,
supra note 129, at 1028. "Human beings seem confident that they do not owe anything to a
stone or a dead twig." Id.
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life through the First Amendment's guarantee of free exercise. 179
The political importance of religion is made especially clear when
one considers that freedom of speech and freedom of the press,
both of which are essential to the workings of a democracy,'8 0 are
also incorporated into the same amendment. It is doubtful
whether religion holds the same position today that it held two
hundred years ago, but there can be little doubt that it continues
to play an important role in American society. At the same time,
it is apparent that society is moving towards greater recognition of
the rights of animals.
As evidenced by the decision in Church of Lukumi, the conflict
between these two interests has been resolved, at least for the
time being, in favor of free exercise of religion. While this may be
perfectly justifiable, as animal rights move to the forefront, society
may have to reexamine its priorities. When straightforward ra-
tional solutions are lacking, moral convictions and religious be-
liefs are still essential to political decision making., 8 In a situa-
tion as complex and ethically challenging as animal rights, it is
almost inevitable that these factors be taken into consideration.
The teachings of St. Francis of Assisi provide an example of how
the two may be reconciled. It must be acknowledged, however,
that the question of how minority beliefs fit into the solution is one
that is not easily answered. Unfortunately, it is quite possible
that as animal rights make further progress, the rights of some
religious groups could be extinguished.
Brendan White
179 See supra note 13 (reciting constitutional provision).
180 See Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939).
181 See generally Greenawalt, supra note 129, at 1011.
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